Tribal mobilization threatens northeast Syria: Sweida as a cautionary tale

As hopes dim for a political settlement between the Democratic Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (DAANES) and the transitional government in Damascus, fears are mounting that a new wave of violence could erupt. 

The warning signs of possible conflict are clear and increasingly alarming. With diplomacy stalled, leaders from various tribes, including Al-Nasser, Al-Saab, Al-Boubna, and Al-Boujaber, are shifting from rhetoric to mobilization, openly calling for armed confrontation with the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). Even more concerning is the continued silence from Damascus.

The pressing question now is whether tribal forces will attempt to replicate their recent military campaign in Sweida, this time targeting the SDF in northeast Syria? And if they do, will Damascus remain on the sidelines, at least until it can leverage the chaos to reassert control over Arab-majority areas in the northeast that it has long sought to reclaim?

For the government, expanding its authority through tribal forces – especially amid stalled negotiations – may seem like an attractive option. However, this approach is dangerously short-sighted. The long-term consequences far outweigh any short-term political gains, as this report by the Arab Reform Initiative (ARI) explains.

The Sweida scenario looms on the horizon

While such a manoeuver might serve short-term interests, it would come at a dangerous cost: deepening ethnic divisions, derailing any path toward national reconciliation, and pushing Syria further away from a durable and inclusive peace.

Tensions between Damascus and the DAANES have long simmered beneath the surface, despite the 10 March agreement that outlined a framework for integrating civilian and military institutions in the northeast into the Syrian state.

Stalled negotiations since then have heightened the strain. But the recent Hasakah conference has deepened the divide, raising new and serious concerns. The 8 August conference, titled “Unity of Position for the Components of Northeast Syria,” was organized by the DAANES to establish a unified stance among different ethnic and religious communities, including tribal leaders aligned with the SDF, ahead of renewed talks with Damascus.

However, the participation of prominent figures opposed to Damascus from outside the region, such as Druze spiritual leader Sheikh Hikmat al-Hijri from Sweida and the Supreme Alawite Islamic Council Ghazal Ghazal, was seen by the Syrian government as a direct provocation.

Meanwhile, the alignment between tribal leaders and the transitional authorities can be seen not merely as symbolic; but as strategic. Both share a common objective: removing the SDF from Arab-majority areas. For many tribal leaders, mobilizing against the SDF is a chance to reassert control over their local territories.

At the same time, it serves Damascus’s broader ambition to reclaim authority over key regions currently beyond its reach. The mobilization of tribes – as a new military actor aligned with, yet distinct from, the government – carries troubling echoes of the clashes in Sweida. Now, in Deir Ezzor and Raqqa – two Arab-majority areas already brimming with frustration toward DAANES governance – a similar scenario may be taking shape.

This escalation builds on years of deep-seated grievances. Tribal leaders have long accused the SDF of marginalizing Arab communities, enforcing compulsory conscription, and consolidating Kurdish political control. Today, those frustrations are being repackaged into a broader rallying cry: “liberating the Jazira under Syria’s umbrella.”

As in Sweida, if this mobilization materializes, it could attract not only tribal forces from across the country but also fighters from a range of factions – particularly Turkish-backed groups based in northwest Syria.

A risky gamble

For the government, expanding its authority through tribal forces – especially amid stalled negotiations – may seem like an attractive option. However, this approach is dangerously short-sighted. The long-term consequences far outweigh any short-term political gains. In this context, five major risks can be identified:

First, a tribal offensive, particularly one perceived as sanctioned or supported by Damascus, would almost certainly destroy any remaining prospects for dialogue with the DAANES. It would deepen Kurdish fears of betrayal, severely erode trust, and make future reconciliation efforts far more difficult – just as the events in Sweida demonstrated.

Second, such a campaign would further inflame already fragile ethnic relations between Arabs and Kurds.

The Syrian government now faces a defining test: it can either allow tribal mobilization to spiral into open conflict, or it can reassert leadership through de-escalation and inclusive dialogue.

Third, the SDF's military capabilities significantly surpass those of the Druze factions. This makes any tribal offensive in northeast Syria far less likely to be resolved quickly. Instead, it could lead to a protracted and destabilizing conflict.

Fourth, ongoing instability would stifle economic recovery.

Fifth, Turkish potential support adds another layer of complexity and danger. Ankara’s hostility toward the SDF and its support for certain tribal factions mean that any escalation could quickly take on a broader regional dimension.

In conclusion, the Syrian government now faces a defining test: it can either allow tribal mobilization to spiral into open conflict, or it can reassert leadership through de-escalation and inclusive dialogue. This requires a renewed commitment to addressing local grievances through negotiation, not force. The alternative is a slow-motion collapse that will spare no one from its devastating ripple effects.

* This analytical piece was prepared by Dr. Haid Haid, Non-resident Senior Fellow at the Arab Reform Initiative. The full text is available via the Arab Reform Initiative (ARI) website.