Has open war with Israel become inevitable?

These past two weeks, a new and potent dose of tension was injected into the region following the assassination of Ismail Haniyeh, the head of Hamas's political bureau, in Tehran. This came just hours after the killing of Fuad Shukr, a senior Hezbollah leader, in Beirut's southern suburbs, and before that, an unprecedented Israeli airstrike on Yemen's Hudaydah Port. These events have accelerated the cycle of escalation between Israel, backed by the United States, on one side, and Iran along with its regional proxies on the other.

An attack on US forces at the Ain al-Asad Base in Iraq, and deadly drone strikes on Nahariya and Haifa by Hezbollah, coupled with the intensifying assaults on northern Israel and the occupied Syrian Golan Heights, are clear indicators of the growing tension.

Perhaps a higher level of calculated escalation may be on the horizon in the coming days as both sides engage in a high-stakes tug-of-war game to test each other's seriousness and resolve.

Iran's strategy of brinkmanship while playing the long game—which it often excels at—and its tactics of keeping its adversaries on edge by maintaining a precarious balance, may compel it to deliver a fitting response to Haniyeh's assassination in Tehran.

Iran's strategy of brinkmanship while playing the long game—which it often excels at—and its tactics of keeping its adversaries on edge by maintaining a precarious balance, may compel it to deliver a fitting response to Haniyeh's assassination in Tehran. Yet, with the looming risk of being dragged into an all-out war, Iran might declare that the price for de-escalation is “the cessation of the war on Gaza”—a condition that it might present as its sole demand to avoid retaliatory action for the assassinations of Haniyeh and Shukr.

This interpretation is supported by Iran's well-known strategy of exhausting all diplomatic means and avenues to achieve its goals before resorting to military force. The cessation of the war on Gaza is a significant objective that shouldn't be underestimated. If achieved—though it remains highly unlikely—Iran would be crowned as a peacemaker where all other regional and international powers have failed. This would also grant Iran a pivotal role in shaping the map of the region and its future. If this assessment proves correct, an Iranian response, coordinated with its allied regional factions, primarily led by Hezbollah and followed by the Houthis, would occur within 48 hours of this announcement, if the demand is not received in a positive light—a scenario that is highly probable.

With the looming risk of being dragged into an all-out war, Iran might declare that the price for de-escalation is “the cessation of the war on Gaza”—a condition that it might present as its sole demand to avoid retaliatory action for the assassinations of Haniyeh and Shukr. This interpretation is supported by Iran's well-known strategy of exhausting all diplomatic means and avenues to achieve its goals before resorting to military force.

Some aspects of this analysis are supported by the unprecedented escalation in April, when Iran responded to Israel's targeting of several Iranian Revolutionary Guard leaders at the Iranian diplomatic compound in Damascus. The direct messages and back-channel diplomacy between the US, Israel, and Iran at that time proved effective. Had it not been for the prior warning from Iran, followed by Israeli preparations with its allies, the retaliatory counter-response could have led to an all-out conflict—something Iran, still haunted by the eight-year war with Iraq in the 1980s, does not desire. That conflict left both sides with heavy losses, destruction in cities including Tehran, and countless injuries and disabilities, such as those sustained by recent Iranian presidential candidate Saeed Jalili.

However, this containment, built on previous successes, has led to overconfidence, risk-taking, and miscalculations on both sides, particularly on Israel's part. As both sides continue to raise their stakes, any misreading of intentions, targeting errors, or technical mistakes, like those seen in Majdal Shams, could lead to things spiraling out of control and a possible open conflict between Iran/Hezbollah and Israel.

According to Axios, a US site known for its intelligence leaks, the US President sent a clear message to Israeli PM Netanyahu regarding the volatile situation. Biden stated that “there is a basis for a ceasefire,” and stressed Netanyahu should "move on it, and move now." This message implies that Tel Aviv should agree to the proposal presented by Biden in late June, which both sides had initially accepted and was approved by the UN Security Council. However, instead of adhering to the agreement, Netanyahu added new, obstructive conditions.

According to Axios, a US site known for its intelligence leaks, US President Joe Biden sent a clear message to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu regarding the volatile situation. Biden stated, “There is a basis for a ceasefire,” and stressed Netanyahu should "move on it, and move now." This message implies that Tel Aviv should agree to the proposal presented by Biden in late June, which both sides had initially accepted and was approved by the UN Security Council. However, instead of adhering to the agreement, Netanyahu added new, obstructive conditions.

The US message would not be clear or serious unless Washington follows it up with indications that it is ready to impose conditions on the transfer of weapons for non-defensive purposes—an unlikely move in an election year. Thus, the message might be just another instance of America’s usual tough rhetoric as a cover to mask its broad support for Israel. The Israel Hayom publication reported that Washington has approved a shipment of MK-83 half-ton bombs to the Israeli Air Force, the munitions Israel needs if it plans to strike Iran's underground nuclear facilities.

The US message to Netanyahu to agree to a ceasefire would not be clear or serious unless Washington follows it up with indications that it is ready to impose conditions on the transfer of weapons for non-defensive purposes—an unlikely move in an election year. Thus, the message might be just another instance of America’s usual tough rhetoric as a cover to mask its broad support for Israel.

Several factors in the current scenario raise concerns about a potential wider conflict. Netanyahu's precarious legal and political situation makes him inclined to push the region toward chaos to avoid impending trials or possible accountability. Thus, he is evading a ceasefire agreement by escalating and prolonging the conflict until the US presidential elections in November, hoping for a Trump victory.

Meanwhile, Iran and Hezbollah are also in a bind due to their relatively restrained defense of one of the key factions resisting Israel, a state they claim to oppose and declare intentions to eliminate. This, coupled with the continuous and severe strikes they have received, suggests a return to the re-establishment of new rules of engagement shaped by Iran’s Operation True Promise (‘al-Waad al-Sadek’) and Israel’s response. It is notable that Israel has refrained from targeting any significant Iranian assets in Syria, a stark contrast to its routine weekly strikes, aside from the early June attack that killed General Saeed Abyar in rural Aleppo.

Several factors in the current scenario raise concerns about a potential wider conflict. Netanyahu's precarious legal and political situation makes him inclined to push the region toward chaos to avoid impending trials or possible accountability. Thus, he is evading a ceasefire agreement by escalating and prolonging the conflict until the US presidential elections in November, hoping for a Trump victory.

At that time, Tehran was focused on internal matters amid the early presidential elections following the death of its president, foreign minister, and several other officials in a helicopter crash on their way back from an official visit to Azerbaijan. The risks associated with solidifying the rules of engagement sometimes outweigh or surpass those of setting them, potentially leading to unclaculated or unintended consequences due to an inaccurate reading of the new reality. The uncertainty gripping the involved parties characterizes the current situation in the region—a Pandora’s box that regional and international players have managed to contain from expanding until now, but just barely.

The fact that both sides, aided by regional and international efforts, have avoided expanding the 10-month conflict in Gaza has strengthened the belief that any escalation by either or both could be contained. Yet, Netanyahu's intentions, as some researchers argue, might be to drag the US into an open war with Iran and its allied groups, seeking personal and strategic goals that could impact Iran's nuclear project while deepening the rift between Washington and Tehran ahead of any potential negotiations—a prospect recently hinted at by Iran's new president, Masoud Pezeshkian, during election his campaign.

The Israel Hayom publication reported that Washington has approved a shipment of MK-83 half-ton bombs to the Israeli Air Force, the munitions Israel needs if it plans to strike Iran's underground nuclear facilities.

Tel Aviv’s success in establishing new rules of engagement remains doubtful. Establishing these rules is crucial for Israel after its deterrence credibility was eroded by Operation Al-Aqsa Storm, which left nearly 60,000 Israelis—who were evacuated from their homes in the north at the behest of their government—plagued with fears and uncertainty. They may not return to their homes until they are firmly convinced that the threat similar to what occurred on the morning of October 7 in the Gaza border settlements has been eliminated.

Despite Tehran and its "axis of resistance" announcing a strong and significant response to the recent Israeli escalation—a response likely to surpass the "political message" delivered through Operation True Promise last April—it is expected to fall short of an all-out war. Tehran is well aware of the risks of escalating into an open war with Israel. The difference this time lies in Hezbollah’s more active and impactful involvement than in the April operation. The Houthis' participation will also be broader and more effective. These three are the main parties directly concerned with responding to the recent Israeli escalation, alongside a fourth party, Hamas, which has a strong motive to make a strong response following the assassination of its top official.

So far, Hamas has not given any indication that could hint at its potential response. Will it carry out the assassination of an Israeli official? A high-profile operation? Or will it kill some of the hostages/prisoners it holds in conjunction with the expected response from Iran and its allied groups? Or will its response be boiled down to merely promoting its most radical leader, Yahya Sinwar, to the position of head of the movement's political bureau, effectively becoming the movement’s leader at all levels?

But so far, Hamas has not given any indication of its plans or a potential response. Will it carry out the assassination of an Israeli official? A high-profile operation? Or will it kill some of the hostages/prisoners it holds in conjunction with the expected response from Iran and its allied groups? Or will its response be boiled down to merely promoting its most radical leader, Yahya Sinwar, to the position of head of the movement's political bureau, effectively becoming the movement’s leader at all levels? Will this madness, which only breeds more madness, inevitably drive the region into chaos?

* The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author’s and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of Raseef22