How will Iran rebuild its military capacity in time for its next battle with Israel?

It is unlikely that Iran will forgive Israel for what happened during the 12 Day War. This was not merely a publicity stunt for Iranian leadership, but rather an affront to national dignity. From the Iranian perspective, there is only one way to restore this dignity: another war that inflicts unbearable damage on Israel — or, at the very least, a thorough preparation for the next war in case Israel decides to attack again. 

This imbalance requires Iran to prepare diligently. So, how will Iran rebuild its military capacity? And what opportunities lie before it?

What remains of Iran’s military capability?

Estimates that Iran’s military capabilities have been severely damaged do not paint the full picture, as Iran is still capable of projecting its power in the region. This was emphasized by United States’ Navy Vice Admiral Charles B. Cooper II, nominee to be the next commander of US Central Command (CENTCOM). Cooper reminded the Senate Armed Services Committee on June 24 Iran continues to represent “the primary and enduring threat” in the Middle East. He noted that Tehran remains military capable due to its ballistic missiles, drones, proxies, and naval capabilities.

While Israel’s military operation did weaken some of Iran’s capabilities, other elements remain intact, despite the destruction of more than half of Iran’s ballistic missile launch platforms. It is believed that around 200 platforms are still operational, according to the Senate hearing.

Iran’s desire to rebuild its military capabilities is not disputed, but the two important questions now are: What does Iran need in order to restore its capabilities? And where can it obtain them?

Rebuilding Iran’s air defense system

Israel targeted Iran’s air defense network before launching its strikes on Iranian nuclear sites in June. Just a few days after the war, Israel rushed to declare that it had achieved “complete air control” over the Iranian capital in what Israeli officials then described as “open Iranian skies” for Israeli attacks. The destruction of Iran’s air defenses also paved the way for US aircraft to carry out strikes on three Iranian nuclear facilities. In response, Iran attacked the US Al-Udeid Air Base in Qatar, before a ceasefire was reached.

These damages render the repairing of Iran’s air defense system a top priority for Tehran. This was noted by retired Israeli Major General and former head of Israel’s National Security Council, Giora Eiland, in an article published on the Hebrew website Walla. Eiland commented: “After realizing the failure of its air defense system, Iran will make a significant effort to acquire new air defense systems, and perhaps obtain modern fighter jets that Russia can provide.”

It is unlikely that Iran will forgive Israel for what happened during the 12 Day War. This was not merely a publicity stunt for Iranian leadership, but rather an affront to national dignity. From the Iranian perspective, there is only one way to restore this dignity: another war that inflicts unbearable damage on Israel – or, at the very least, a thorough preparation for the next war in case Israel decides to attack again. 

This effort has become evident in statements by Iranian officials. State media, citing a senior Iranian military official, reported that Iran had “restored its air defense network,” which was heavily targeted during last month's conflict with Israel. Deputy Chief of Operations of the Iranian Army, Admiral Mahmoud Mousavi, said: “Some of our air defenses were damaged, and this is not something we can hide, but our colleagues used domestic resources and replaced them with pre-arranged systems that were stored in suitable locations in order to keep the airspace secure,” according to Reuters.

Meanwhile, Iran’s parliament is presenting a new bill to increase military spending, as Tehran looks to acquire advanced weapons from abroad. A commander in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) confirmed the purchase of Russian Su-35 fighter jets earlier this year. A recent German intelligence report also warned that “Iran’s illicit efforts to procure missile technology from Europe are high – and on the rise.”

Israel, for its part, is well aware of Iran’s preparations. In late June, Israeli Army Minister Israel Katz said he had instructed the Israeli military to prepare a plan targeting Iran’s nuclear and missile programs. In a post on X, Katz said that the “implementation plan” focuses on “maintaining Israel’s air control, preventing nuclear advancement and missile production, and responding to Iran for its support of terrorist activity against Israel.”

What Iran needs to restore its capabilities

Iran’s desire to rebuild its military capabilities is not disputed, but the two important questions now are: What does Iran need in order to restore its capabilities? And where can it obtain them?

Iran wants to strengthen its aerial power, and therefore it may “purchase the combat-proven Chinese J-10CE fighter or the Russian Su-75 ‘Checkmate’ stealth fighter,” according to the National Security Journal. To reconstitute its air defenses, Tehran is likely to seek additional Russian surface-to-air missile systems, such as the S-300 and S-400. It will also aim to “acquire Russian-made precision glide bombs, which would provide a cost-effective and powerful offensive capability.” Such acquisitions would “significantly upgrade” Iran’s ability to sustain a prolonged conflict.

“While economic sanctions pose a significant obstacle, Iran has expertise in bypassing international restrictions using tools such as front companies, black-market technology, and support from allies like the current Iraqi regime. All this makes the rebuilding of military power possible – but not quickly or comprehensively. Rather, it will be gradual, under a cloak of secrecy and extreme caution.”

However, these purchases face several obstacles, the first being the need for major investment and long training periods to operate new aircraft. The more pressing question here is: Will Russia and China provide them to Iran?

Iran’s calculations with Russia

One of the lessons of the Iran–Israel war clearly demonstrated that neither Russia nor China wishes to be seen as escalating the conflict in the Middle East. Moscow and Beijing did not seek to prolong the war against Tehran, nor do they want to lose a strategic partner or see Iran’s military infrastructure widely destroyed. Yet their stance reflects a complex and delicate reality: both found themselves constrained by a web of careful calculations and sensitive balances that limit their decisions and leave them only a narrow margin for maneuver toward Tehran, according to a paper by the Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies.

To reconstitute its air defenses, Tehran is likely to seek additional Russian surface-to-air missile systems, such as the S-300 and S-400. It will also aim to “acquire Russian-made precision glide bombs, which would provide a cost-effective and powerful offensive capability.”

In this context, Kamil AlBoshoka, a researcher at the Dialogue Institute for Research and Studies, told Raseef22 that “the Russian–Chinese position during the war constituted a strategic shock for Iran, as Moscow and Beijing preferred not to support it militarily, fearing damage to their deep relations with the Arab Gulf states. Likewise, China and Russia do not want to undermine their interests with Turkey, nor enter into an uncalculated confrontation with the United States and its allies.”

He added, “It is likely that Russia and China quietly do not oppose the United States sliding into a long, exhausting war in Iran – similar in principle to what happened in Ukraine against Russia. 

“While Moscow sees draining Washington militarily as serving its position on the European front, Beijing views this distraction as an opportunity to accelerate its steps toward Taiwan without a decisive US response. 

“From this perspective, it is not expected that Beijing or Moscow will provide Tehran with advanced offensive weapons. Rather, they will maintain their relationship with Iran within the framework of limited political coordination, along with undeclared technical and economic support.”

For her part, Irina Tsukerman, a US national security lawyer and analyst, told Raseef22: “Iran’s cooperation with Russia — its quasi-traditional ally in the Syrian arena and preferred arms supplier for decades — has been undermined, particularly after Moscow failed to defend its own airspace from Ukrainian drones, became reliant on Iranian drones, and found its geopolitical focus consumed by Europe. 

“All of these factors have eroded Tehran’s trust in Russia. It is likely that the Iranian–Russian partnership during the war with Israel revealed deep limitations in Russian logistics, satellite coordination, and electronic warfare. This breach of trust will force Iran to reduce its dependence on Russia’s aging military technology and ideological stagnation.”

China’s calculations

Although China considers Iran a key player in its network of economic interests in the region– since, according to estimates, over 90% of Iranian oil exports currently go to China despite US sanctions, in addition to Iran’s geostrategic role in China’s Belt and Road initiative – at the same time, China also maintains intertwined relations with Israel and maintains a careful balance of power with the United States.

As for potential cooperation between China and Iran, reports on deals between the two countries are contradictory. Some accounts have claimed that Iran strengthened its air defenses with Chinese assistance after the truce ended the 12-day war, according to The Cradle. The report stated that “Iran has taken possession of Chinese surface-to-air missile batteries,” adding that Tehran is moving “rapidly” to rebuild air defense capabilities targeted by Israel during the war. An Arab official told the outlet that “the Chinese batteries were delivered to Iran after the ceasefire,” while Newsweek reported that the accuracy of such claims have not been confirmed.

“All of these factors have eroded Tehran’s trust in Russia. It is likely that the Iranian–Russian partnership during the war with Israel revealed deep limitations in Russian logistics, satellite coordination, and electronic warfare. This breach of trust will force Iran to reduce its dependence on Russia’s aging military technology and ideological stagnation.”

A report by Tom O’Connor in Newsweek argued that Iran’s outreach to China “marks a departure from its long-standing efforts to obtain weapons from Russia, whose ability to deliver on such deals remains limited due to its ongoing war in Ukraine and other geopolitical constraints.”

Chinese sources indicated that Beijing has remained “relatively insulated” from two of the world’s fiercest ongoing wars – those in Eastern Europe and the Middle East – adding that conditions may be favorable for greater military cooperation between Beijing and Tehran, particularly since “both China and Iran are victims of certain policies pursued by Western powers.” However, if Tehran seeks to elevate its cooperation with Beijing to something resembling the “iron-clad pact” between China and Pakistan, Iran “would likely need to reevaluate its foreign policy outlook.”

In this context, Tsukerman told Raseef22, “China is now caught in its own geopolitical contradictions – between maintaining its balance in the Middle East and its ties with the Arab Gulf states, its economic interests in Iraq and Iran, and its cautious detachment from regional conflict dynamics. Beijing’s hesitation to intervene or materially support Tehran during the war also left Iranian officials disappointed. Despite the public displays of strategic partnership, China ultimately prioritized commercial stability over ideological alignment or defense cooperation.”

Tsukerman added, “In addition to growing concern among Chinese leaders about secondary sanctions and reputational risks tied to overt military cooperation with Tehran, Beijing may continue to purchase Iranian oil at discounted rates or expand its dual-use investments under a civilian guise. Yet it will likely avoid direct cooperation in the defense sector, while quietly shifting its focus toward the Gulf states, where it sees far greater financial opportunities and diplomatic capital. 

“These states provide far more significant sovereign investments, logistical integration, and global influence than the militarily weak and politically isolated Iran.”

What will Iran do?

The Carnegie research center, anticipating the course Iran might take in the future, suggested that Tehran may move toward “developing a clandestine nuclear capability under the cover of civilian enrichment.” This follows its conclusion that conventional deterrence alone does not guarantee the survival of the regime. The nuclear program is no longer treated as a bargaining chip to ease sanctions, but rather portrayed as an integral part of the national defense system – one that withstood the war and now must be fortified against future threats.

As for Tsukerman, she believes Iran’s postwar strategy will lean toward greater military self-reliance and decentralized regional partnerships. This includes renewed investment in the domestic production of missiles and drones, cyberwarfare capabilities, and satellite infrastructure. Tehran has long excelled at innovation under pressure, exploiting smuggled parts, reverse engineering, and diaspora science networks to circumvent sanctions.

In addition to growing concern among Chinese leaders about secondary sanctions and reputational risks tied to overt military cooperation with Tehran, Beijing may continue to purchase Iranian oil at discounted rates or expand its dual-use investments under a civilian guise. Yet it will likely avoid direct cooperation in the defense sector, while quietly shifting its focus toward the Gulf states, where it sees far greater financial opportunities and diplomatic capital. 

Tsukerman explains that North Korea will remain a covert but important partner, providing missile technology, materials, and testing expertise. Venezuela, as well as elements in Syria or Iraq, could serve as secret procurement hubs. 

Turkey’s ambiguous stance may open indirect opportunities through dual-use trade channels, while Pakistan and Central Asian states could become discreet routes for logistics and components despite their official neutrality. Iran may also seek to deepen military cooperation with non-Western actors in the Global South, including African regimes, weapons developers in Southeast Asia, and defense sectors in South America.

AlBoshoka concurs with this view. “Iran’s biggest bet will be on domestic capabilities. In this context, Tehran will focus on three tracks: first, developing ballistic missile programs that have proven relatively effective; second, accelerating progress in undeclared nuclear technology as a strategic deterrent; and third, strengthening asymmetric warfare capabilities through security networks and regional militias. 

“While economic sanctions pose a significant obstacle, Iran has expertise in bypassing international restrictions using tools such as front companies, black-market technology, and support from allies like the current Iraqi regime. All this makes the rebuilding of military power possible – but not quickly or comprehensively. Rather, it will be gradual, under a cloak of secrecy and extreme caution.”

AlBoshoka added that Tehran views the postwar period as an opportunity to redraw its military doctrine in line with its new geopolitical reality. The greatest opportunity lies in leveraging what Iran proclaims as its wartime resilience to build a populist narrative for internal and regional polarization, while simultaneously pushing its domestic defense industries to more advanced stages – particularly in drone technologies and cyberwarfare.

This report was published in collaboration with Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung.