Eleven months of genocide: Why hasn’t Israel achieved its “absolute victory” in Gaza yet?

Israel has killed over 40,000 people since the beginning of its genocidal war on Gaza, in addition to injuring more than 93,000 others. In the past 11 months, the Israeli military has committed dozens of massacres and displaced nearly two million people, almost the entire population of the Gaza Strip. Yet, despite all these atrocities, Israel has failed to achieve what Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu repeatedly calls "absolute victory" in every speech, video, and public appearance.

Since Israel launched its ongoing war of extermination on Gaza on October 7, 2023, it appears Tel Aviv has found itself in a war it does not know how to end. More importantly, the once-dominant "assumption" in Israel about achieving "absolute victory" is now—nearly 11 months into the conflict—being seriously questioned. This uncertainty is based on the goals Israel set at the outset of the war and how far those objectives have been met after months of fighting.

No precise numbers on Hamas's military capabilities

The starting point for understanding any war and its potential outcomes is to assess the military capabilities of each side. The reality is that a comparison between the military strengths of Israel and Hamas, which controls the Gaza Strip, suggests very different results to the war than what we are witnessing today.

Since Israel launched its ongoing war of extermination on Gaza on October 7, 2023, it appears Tel Aviv has found itself in a war it does not know how to end. More importantly, the once-dominant "assumption" in Israel about achieving "absolute victory" is now—nearly 11 months into the conflict—under serious doubt.

The classic assumption that the Israeli army is far stronger than Hamas, which would mean that victory is guaranteed for Israel, is reminiscent of the United States' mindset at the onset of the Vietnam War. At the time, the US believed its superior military equipment and weaponry guaranteed an easy win. However, reality showed how the invading troops sank into the quagmire of Vietnam without a decisive outcome.

In Israel, officials made the same mistake, but on an even larger scale. Israeli estimates of Hamas's military capabilities were inaccurate. When the Israeli army entered the Gaza Strip—which has been besieged for 18 years—they were shocked by the vast quantities of weapons and ammunition that allowed small groups of fighters to continue the battle for such a prolonged period. Moreover, the network of underground tunnels significantly facilitated Hamas's operations.

Hamas does not disclose figures regarding its fighters, but estimates at the start of the war suggested their number ranged between 30,000 and 40,000. According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, Hamas's military wing, the Ezzedeen Al-Qassam Brigades, had 15,000 to 20,000 fighters. The Israeli Institute for National Security Studies estimates this number at 15,000.

For his part, Israeli military and strategic expert Moshe Elad, in a statement to AlHurra, claimed that Israel had succeeded in destroying 22 out of 25 Hamas battalions in Gaza. He also alleged Israel had managed to eliminate 17,000 Hamas fighters and other factions in the Gaza Strip.

Unachievable goals

The pressing question here is: Why has Israel not achieved "absolute victory" over Hamas? This question relates to the concept of victory defined by Israel—or, more precisely, by Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu. As he stated in the early days of the war, their goals were to completely eliminate Hamas, free Israeli hostages, and establish an alternative rule to that of Hamas in Gaza. It is no secret that none of these three objectives have been achieved to this day.

The classic assumption that the Israeli army is far stronger than Hamas, which would mean that victory is guaranteed for Israel, is reminiscent of the United States' mindset at the onset of the Vietnam War. At the time, the US believed its superior military equipment and weaponry guaranteed an easy win. However, reality showed how the invading troops sank into the quagmire of Vietnam without a decisive outcome. In Israel, officials made the same mistake.

The crisis Israel faces regarding these goals is that they contradict each other. If Israel aims to defeat Hamas and collapse its authority, the war must continue, which would compromise the goal of securing the release of Israeli hostages through a deal that would halt the war for it to be implemented. This viewpoint was expressed by former military leader Itzhak Brik in an article for Maariv, where he explains why the war objectives have not been met.

Brik wrote: “The justification from the Israeli right-wing, which has called for the continuation of the war until Hamas is defeated, is that stopping the war to secure the release of hostages would unleash another holocaust on Israel by Hamas for many years, similar to what happened to us on October 7, 2023. According to them, the number of civilians who will be killed in the future is much greater than the number of hostages we would save now. Therefore, the Israeli right believes that the fight against Hamas must continue until absolute victory, even if it comes at the cost of freeing the hostages.”

In another article in Maariv, Brik revealed that he had met with Netanyahu six times since the beginning of the war on Gaza. He formed the impression that Netanyahu fully understands the impossibility of completely eliminating Hamas. Nevertheless, this has not prevented him from proclaiming from various platforms that Israel will continue to fight until "absolute victory."

Missed opportunities

If Hamas is still capable of launching rockets toward Israeli settlements after nearly 11 months of war and still holds control of the Gaza Strip unchallenged, it suggests that despite the Israeli army's tactical successes—such as targeted assassinations and specialized incursion operations—the complete eradication of Hamas has not been achieved.

The pressing question here is: Why has Israel not achieved "absolute victory" over Hamas? This question relates to the concept of victory defined by Israel—or, more precisely, by Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu. As he stated in the early days of the war, their goals were to completely eliminate Hamas, free Israeli hostages, and establish an alternative rule to that of Hamas in Gaza. It is no secret that none of these three objectives have been achieved to this day.

Another explanation for Israel's failure to achieve total victory, proposed by Israeli analyst Yossi Hadar in an article for Maariv, is what he described as "missing the opportunity to translate the Israeli army's achievements into a political victory and change the civil authority in the Gaza Strip." Hadar argued that this could have either destroyed Hamas's military power or at least inflicted significant damage. He pointed out that Netanyahu's evasion in the early months of the war, his refusal to discuss "the day after the war," and his rejection of the entry of Palestinian Authority representatives, as well as Arab and international forces, into Gaza, all contributed to the survival of Hamas's authority and continued rule.

Hadar also criticized Netanyahu's initial handling of the war, which focused heavily on the northern Gaza Strip while neglecting Rafah and the Philadelphi Route. He considered this one of the factors that prevented Israel from achieving a much larger success. Hadar wrote, "Netanyahu must understand that if he hasn't achieved victory within 10 months, he will never win."

Criticism of military operations

Other explanations for Israel's failure to decisively end the war with Hamas relate to the logistical complexities within Gaza, due to the tunnel network, and the argument that Israel needed to strike with greater force and intensity. According to Maariv, 80% of the hundreds of kilometers of Hamas tunnels are still under the group's control. It also says Hamas fighters number in the tens of thousands, with many still hiding in the tunnels, while others blend in with civilians on the surface.

Maariv suggested that in order to eradicate Hamas, the Israeli army needed to destroy the group's main infrastructure, that is, the tunnels. It wasn't enough to demolish Hamas's buildings and combat infrastructure above ground; the Israeli army did very little underground to destroy the hundreds of kilometers of tunnels in Gaza, beneath the Philadelphi Route and the Netzarim Corridor. This implies that the Israeli army would need to remain in the Gaza Strip for a long time after destroying the area.

Former Israeli military leader Itzhak Brik revealed in Maariv that he had met with Netanyahu six times since the beginning of the war on Gaza. He formed the impression that Netanyahu fully understands the impossibility of completely eliminating Hamas. Nevertheless, this has not prevented him from proclaiming from various platforms that Israel will continue to fight until "absolute victory."

Maariv also noted that the Israeli army did not prepare adequately or devise appropriate measures to destroy the tunnels over the past years. This is due to Israeli estimates suggesting that another imminent war on Gaza was unlikely, as Israel's focus had shifted to the northern front with Hezbollah.

Political and military analyst Giora Eiland agreed with the notion that Israel's approach has been flawed. In an article in Yedioth Ahronoth, he mentioned that Israel acted with strength during the first two months of the war, but due to US pressure, Israel reduced the intensity of its operations after the American administration noted that Israel was "killing too many civilians in Gaza."

Eiland pointed out that the pauses between the phases of the war in the northern Gaza Strip, Khan Younis, and later between Khan Younis and Rafah, prevented Israel from achieving victory. According to him, these successive halts allowed Hamas to recover.

Eiland proposed a more extreme idea, suggesting that Israel could have achieved better results by imposing a stricter "siege" and controlling Gaza's borders with Egypt, completely preventing the entry of food and fuel supplies into Gaza. He argued that while Yahya Sinwar, Hamas's leader, might not care about casualties, he couldn't ignore a cut-off of water and supplies. Eiland claimed that such a strategy would have enabled Israel to win in a shorter time.

The long war

Amos Yadlin, the former head of the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), expressed his views in an article, stating that an "absolute victory," which implies the continuation of the war in Gaza along with the ongoing regional confrontations Israel is engaged in on multiple fronts, poses threats to Israel that are far greater than what remains of Hamas's strength in the Gaza Strip.

He added, "Distributing our already limited forces across the Philadelphi and Netzarim axes will not lead to Hamas's eradication in Gaza. Instead, it will result in a prolonged guerrilla war in the Gaza Strip, simultaneous escalation in other arenas, and possibly the death of hostages in Hamas tunnels. Israel might become embroiled in a long-term war of attrition, with the Israeli economy continuing to deteriorate, Israel's global standing plummeting to new lows, and intensified legal persecution in international courts."

"Netanyahu’s strategy of 'absolute victory' serves the Iranian strategy, which aims to entangle Israel in a prolonged war of attrition on multiple fronts simultaneously, until Israel collapses."

Yadlin concluded, "In reality, the strategy of 'absolute victory' serves the Iranian strategy, which aims to entangle Israel in a prolonged war of attrition on multiple fronts simultaneously, until Israel collapses."

Hamas's survival: Does this mean its victory?

The prevailing sentiment in Israel and the world now leans towards "leaving Hamas in power." Mediators from the United States, Egypt, and Qatar are pushing for a ceasefire, and in Israel, the discussion about a Hamas alternative is no longer as intense as it was at the war's outset. This can be interpreted as mediators abandoning the idea of replacing Hamas, and Israel seems poised to shift its focus from the goal of "eradicating Hamas" to the more ambiguous term "absolute victory."

The current ceasefire plan and the ongoing negotiations aim to keep Hamas in power. An analysis by The Jerusalem Post suggests that the outcome of this could be Hamas returning to govern most of the Gaza Strip in the coming years. The reconstruction efforts are likely to empower Hamas, as they did in the past.

"If the current situation continues, Israel might become embroiled in a long-term war of attrition, with the Israeli economy continuing to deteriorate, Israel's global standing plummeting to new lows, and intensified legal persecution in international courts."

The Israeli newspaper highlights that unless a different government in Gaza replaces Hamas, the group will be involved with donors in the reconstruction process and will have a hand in every building being rebuilt. The paper notes that in the past, Hamas constructed tunnel corridors under buildings, including tunnels beneath schools and community centers. The article suggests they will also be able to store weapons in the rebuilt areas, effectively rebuilding Hamas's capabilities within a few years.

For Israel, if Hamas is allowed to remain, it will declare victory. The question remains for Israel: How can it declare victory in the war if Hamas continues to hold power in Gaza?